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The War Powers Resolution and 
Public Opinion 
Dr. Gregory P. Noone, Ph.D., J.D.∗ 
This essay focuses on the 1973 War Powers Resolution 
(WPR) and the impact of public opinion.  Over the last forty 
years it might best be described as “political cover” for 
Congress. It allows Congress to abdicate its role in making 
decisions that might ultimately prove unpopular with voters.  
Congress may seek adherence to the WPR when there is 
disagreement among the elite. But more often than not there are 
few calls for a WPR. There are electoral disincentives for 
confronting the president over foreign policy. However, research 
indicates that the WPR appears to have impacted the behavior 
of presidents because presidents have rarely used force for more 
than sixty days without congressional authorization.  
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I. Introduction 
The 1973 War Powers Resolution (often alternatively referred to 
as the War Powers Act—its title in the Senate version of the law) has 
been described as constitutionally unnecessary as well as a “fraud” 
and “feckless.”1 But over the last forty years it might best be 
described as “political cover” for Congress. 
Jack Goldsmith describes the phenomenon of policy approval in 
Washington D.C. in the political context. Such as when President 
George W. Bush did “soft things” like releasing detainees from 
Guantanamo Bay and trying suspected terrorists in civilian courts in 
the United States. The Democrats liked the policy and the 
Republicans liked the president. Whereas, when President Barack 
Obama does “hard things” such as using unmanned aerial vehicles 
(also known as “drones”) for targeted killings in Yemen and Pakistan, 
the Republicans like the policy and the Democrats like the president. 
Both of these concepts are rooted in partisanship for at least one side 
in each scenario. With that said, playing against type has a long 
history in American politics. Only a hardline anti-Communist such as 
President Richard M. Nixon could go to China. President William J. 
Clinton succeeded in welfare reform, and President George W. Bush 
reshaped education at the local level with No Child Left Behind. 
But partisanship does not necessarily hold true when the 
president uses force that would clearly fall under the rubric of the 
War Powers Resolution (WPR). The partisanship angle of this issue 
requires an examination of congressional support for presidential use 
of force. In other words, does congressional support simply follow 
partisan lines? Through an examination of polling data, the results 
indicated that congressional behavior was not based on partisanship 
but more on tracking the public opinion of the American people. With 
a few outliers on each end of the spectrum, such as Congressman 
Dennis Kucinich (D-Ohio) and Congressman Ron Paul (R-Texas), 
most of Congress will support the president’s use of force regardless of 
party so long as the polling data indicates strong public support. 
Therefore, Congress’ action is more closely linked to public 
opinion than party affiliation. This is not a surprise to anyone who 
follows politics, but use of force decisions involve sending men and 
women into harm’s way. One would hope such decisions are made 
because of principled positions of leaders as opposed to followers with 
their fingers in the air.  
1. H.R.J. Res. 542, Pub. L. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973) (codified at 50 
U.S.C. §§ 1541–1548). For a comprehensive history of the War Powers 
Resolution see the accompanying articles in this publication by 
Professor Robert Turner, Professor Michael Newton, and former 
Department of State lawyer John Crook.  
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Congress may seek adherence to the WPR when there is 
disagreement among the elite (i.e., the president, politicians, media, 
intellectuals, experts). But more often than not there are few calls for 
a WPR, and the leadership and members in both parties are happy to 
let the president go on his own. However, when public opinion, as 
demonstrated through national polls (and arguably through 
constituent contact, which is very difficult to measure and of which 
very little data is available), is opposed to the use of military force 
abroad the likelihood of calls for a WPR increase. This is a bit of a 
“chicken or an egg” issue because some researchers argue that a 
consensus of elite opinion forms and guides public opinion and not the 
other way around.2 Unfortunately there isn’t any solid evidence, but 
it is doubtful that the vast majority of politicians in Congress have a 
desire to be out of step with their constituents—especially 
Representatives.  
In general, the more complex the issue and the more unified 
elites are about the appropriate policy response, the less likely 
public opinion will oppose and constrain the policy-making elite. 
But when the facts of the issue are relatively easy to grasp and 
elite opinion is divided, then public opinion may wield 
significant influence and operate as an important constraint on 
policy making.3  
For example, the elites and the public both supported 
humanitarian relief in Somalia in the summer of 1992. However, elite-
level disagreement arose over the next year as the mission there 
evolved from easy to understand humanitarian relief to complex 
offensive operations against warlords. Public support for the mission 
eroded by October 1993 and fell by another ten points after eighteen 
Army Rangers were killed in Mogadishu. 
Frankly, Congress is happy to let the president take singular 
responsibility (i.e., pay any potential electoral price) for the use of 
force. However, time always diminishes U.S. public support for 
military action overseas. No matter how popular an exercise of 
American power may be at the beginning, support will erode. The 
only question is how quickly.  
2. See James Burk, Public Support for Peacekeeping in Lebanon and 
Somalia: Assessing the Casualties Hypothesis, 114 POL. SCI. Q. 53, 60 
(1999) (explaining that public opinion is shaped by the “views of elites 
whose judgments and opinions are broadcast electronically and reported 
in print”). See also Adam J. Berinsky, Assuming the Costs of War: 
Events, Elites, and American Public Support for Military Conflict, 69 J. 
POL. 975, 975 (2007) (arguing that political elites determine if the public 
will rally to war). 
3. Burk, supra note 2, at 60. 
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The duration of the conflict and the number of casualties directly 
impacts the level of support. For example, support at the start of the 
Korean War in June 1950 was at 78% and a majority of Americans 
supported it after two months.4 However, by January 1951, as 
casualties mounted, 49% of the American public thought the war was 
a mistake.5 
More recently, United States action with NATO in Libya 
garnered a 47% approval versus 37% disapproval on March 21, 2011.6 
However, by June 22, 2011, the numbers had flipped with only 39% of 
the American people approving and 46% expressing disapproval. This 
immediate drop in support was especially quick since there was not a 
single U.S. combat casualty or any boots on the ground.7 
When there is contentious debate and public opinion is split prior 
to the commencement of hostilities, it quickly coalesces once the 
shooting starts. For example, prior to the 1991 Gulf War only 55% of 
the American public supported going to war, but as soon as the 
campaign kicked-off the support number rose sharply to 79% at the 
beginning of the air war and reached 84% shortly thereafter.8 The 
same happened prior to the Iraq War in 2003 as support hovered 
around 57% but quickly rose to 76% once the war commenced.9  
4. Steve Crabtree, The Gallup Brain: Americans and the Korean War, 
GALLUP (Feb. 4, 2003), http://www.gallup.com/poll/7741/gallup-brain-
americans-korean-war.aspx.  
5. Id.  
6. Jeffrey M. Jones, Americans Approve of Military Action Against Libya, 
47% to 37%, GALLUP (Mar. 22, 2011), http://www.gallup.com/poll 
/146738/americans-approve-military-action-against-libya.aspx.  
7. Foreign wars aren’t the only thing that loses support over time. In a 
Gallup poll conducted September 7–10, 2001 less than 1% of Americans 
viewed terrorism as the country’s most important problem. After 
September 11, 2001, that number spiked to 46%, receded to 11% on the 
fifth anniversary, and by the nine year mark was back below 1%. Frank 
Newport, Nine Years After 9/11, Few See Terrorism as Top U.S. 
Problem, GALLUP (Sept. 10, 2010), http://www.gallup.com/poll/142 
961/nine-years-few-terrorism-top-problem.aspx.  
8. Frank Newport, David W. Moore & Jeffrey M. Jones, Special Release: 
American Opinion on the War, GALLUP (Mar. 21, 2003), http:// 
www.gallup.com/poll/8068/special-release-american-opinion-war.aspx. In 
examining all interstate military conflicts from 1945 to 2001 researchers 
discovered that UN Security Council support significantly increased 
support among the American public for the president’s proposed use of 
force. See Terrence L. Chapman & Dan Reiter, The United Nations 
Security Council and the Rally ‘Round the Flag Effect, 48 J. CONFLICT 
RESOL. 886, 893 (2004). 
9. Newport, Moore & Jones, supra note 8.  
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Dramatic, sharply focused events which involve Americans 
placed in harms way [sic] on foreign soil are part of a class of 
occurrences known as rally events, so named because they 
typically cause the American public to “rally around the flag” 
and usually result in increased job approval ratings for the 
sitting president.10 
Support dissipates over time as the percentage of those supporting 
the conflict invariably decreases and the conversation turns to asking 
Americans if the war was a mistake. At the beginning of the Iraq War 
only 27% thought it a mistake, but by July 2005, 53% of Americans 
felt it was a mistake sending troops to Iraq.11 By March 2006, 60% of 
Americans stated that the Iraq War was not worth it, and that 
number held steady in 2009 at 58%.12  
For most of its duration a majority of Americans believed the 
Korean War was not a mistake.  Whereas from August 1968 onwards 
a majority of Americans consistently stated the Vietnam War was a 
mistake.13 By May 1971, that number rose to two-to-one in 
opposition.14 With that said, most Americans believed Iraq was a 
mistake within fifteen months of its start whereas it took more than 
three years for a majority of Americans to feel Vietnam was a 
mistake. In contrast, less than 10% of Americans felt that the 
10. Frank Newport, Clinton Receives Record High Job Approval Rating 
After Impeachment Vote and Iraq Air Strikes, GALLUP (Dec. 24, 1998), 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/4111/clinton-receives-record-high-job-
approval-rating-after-impeachment-vot.aspx.  
11. Frank Newport & Joseph Carroll, Iraq Versus Vietnam: A Comparison 
of Public Opinion, GALLUP (Aug. 24, 2005), http://www.gallup.com 
/poll/18097/iraq-versus-vietnam-comparison-public-opinion.aspx; Jeffrey 
M. Jones, Special Analysis: Americans Divide into Four Grounds on 
Iraq War, GALLUP (July 5, 2005), http://www.gallup.com/poll/17164 
/special-analysis-americans-divide-into-four-groups-iraq-war.aspx.  
12. Iraq, GALLUP, http://www.gallup.com/poll/1633/iraq.aspx; Frank 
Newport, Americans Upbeat on Progress in Iraq, Afghanistan, GALLUP 
(July 16, 2009), http://www.gallup.com/poll/121727/Americans-Upb 
eat-Progress-Iraq-Afghanistan.aspx. The portion of the public who 
supported the war the longest were overwhelmingly Republicans, white, 
Protestant, and frequent churchgoers. Frank Newport, Protestants and 
Frequent Churchgoers Most Supportive of Iraq War, GALLUP (Mar. 16, 
2006), http://www.gallup.com/poll/21937/protestants-frequent-church 
goers-most-supportive-iraq-war.aspx.  
13. Crabtree, supra note 3; Newport & Carroll, supra note 11. January 30, 
1968 was the launch of the Tet Offensive.  Tet was a military failure for 
the Viet Cong but it impacted Americans’ view as to the progress of the 
war. 
14. Jeffrey M. Jones, Opposition to Iraq War Reaches New High, GALLUP 
(Apr. 24, 2008), http://www.gallup.com/poll/106783/opposition-iraq-
war-reaches-new-high.aspx.  
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Afghanistan War was a mistake at the outset but that number has 
steadily risen and by April 2011 reached 42%.15 
II. The Vietnam Effect 
A direct result of the unpopular Vietnam War was the passage of 
the War Powers Resolution. It states in part: 
The President, in every possible instance, shall consult with 
Congress before introducing United States Armed Forces into 
hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in 
hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, and after 
every such introduction shall consult regularly with the 
Congress until United States Armed Forces are no longer 
engaged in hostilities or have been removed from such 
situations.16 
The WPR is one of the most significant legacies of the Vietnam 
War. However, the Vietnam experience offered many lessons for 
political and military leaders and chief among them “was that the 
military could not deploy effectively or for very long without public 
support.”17 In fact, part of the often-quoted Weinberger doctrine 
requires “some reasonable assurance” of public support before 
committing armed forces abroad for combat.18 The WPR is the result 
of Congress’ desire to reassert its constitutional authority, but the 
concept of keeping an eye on public opinion during a foreign war has 
not been lost on politicians.  
III. Congress Is a Distant Third 
Another reason Congress allows the president to lead when it 
comes to military action overseas is that Congress is a distant third 
behind the office of the presidency and the military in the public’s 
eye. In April 2011, President Obama’s highest approval rating was for 
his handling of foreign affairs and he has averaged 50% during his 
15. Frank Newport, Americans Divided on How Things Are Going in 
Afghanistan, GALLUP (Apr. 8, 2011), http://www.gallup.com/poll/1470 
11/americans-divided-things-going-afghanistan.aspx.  
16. H.R.J. Res. 542, Pub. L. 93-148, § 3, 87 Stat. 555 (1973) (codified at 50 
U.S.C. § 1542). 
17. Burk, supra note 2, at 53. 
18. CASPAR W. WEINBERGER, FIGHTING FOR PEACE (1990). This concept is 
sometimes referred to as the Weinberger-Powell doctrine or the Powell 
doctrine. 
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first term.19 This is middle of the pack for presidents since the poll 
began. Obama’s rating is higher than Reagan’s and George W. 
Bush’s, however it is narrowly behind Clinton’s, but ultimately 
behind the elder Bush’s 63% average.20 In fact, since 2000, the 
American public has trusted the U.S. government, particularly the 
president, more with international problems than domestic. 
In June 2011, a poll taken to assess the public’s confidence in 
institutions the U.S. military received the highest rating at 78% (11% 
above its historic average of 67%).21 The presidency received a 
confidence rating of 35% (10% below its historic average), and 
Congress received a confidence rating of 12% (14% below its historic 
average).22 This poll has been conducted thirty-five times since 1973 
and indicates that the military has been number one since 1989 (with 
the exception of 1997 when small business was added to the survey). 
An analysis of this annual survey indicates that the public’s 
confidence level in the military is higher when it is engaged in 
military operations. In fact, the public overwhelmingly supports the 
military especially during conflict. Given Congress’ low ratings it is 
clear why members of Congress do not want to appear to be anything 
other than supportive of the military. 
“Opposing the use of force is no less risky domestically than it 
was before the [WPR’s] passage.”23 There are “electoral disincentives 
for confronting the president over foreign policy.”24 There is a 
particular price to pay if members of congress attempt to constrain 
the executive by cutting off funding. Allegations of being unpatriotic 
or abandoning U.S. forces in the field will hurt re-election bids.25 
congressional votes for funding the use of force are usually 
overwhelming and decisive. 
However, when public support declines, Congress is more likely to 
assert itself by maintaining that the president is violating the law (if 
the WPR is applicable) rather than reducing or eliminating funding. 
19. Jeffrey M. Jones, Obama Still Fares Better on Foreign Than Domestic 
Issues, GALLUP (Apr. 1, 2011), http://www.gallup.com/poll/146930/ 
obama-fares-better-foreign-domestic-issues.aspx. 
20. Id.  
21. Jeffrey M. Jones, Americans Most Confident in Military, Least in 
Congress, GALLUP (June 23, 2011), http://www.gallup.com/poll/148163 
/americans-confident-military-least-congress.aspx.  
22. Id.  
23. David P. Auswald & Peter F. Cowhey, Ballotbox Diplomacy: The War 
Powers Resolution and the Use of Force, 41 INT’L STUD. Q. 505, 506 
(1997). 
24. Id.  
25. See id. at 511.  
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Congress uses the law as a shield against charges of being 
“unpatriotic.”26 
There is some good news for Congress. As much as the members 
are trying to follow the public, the public often has difficulty following 
them. In February 2007, when the national conversation was about a 
potential troop surge and timetables in Iraq, 70% of Americans stated 
that their Representative’s position on the war was in Iraq will be a 
factor in deciding their vote in the next congressional election.27 
However, 64% of those polled were unsure as to exactly what their 
Representative’s position on the war and more specifically President 
Bush’s plan to increase the number of troops in Iraq.28 This lack of 
awareness proves useful because by 60% to 38% Americans opposed 
the troop surge, 57% to 40% believed Congress should limit the 
number of troops in Iraq, and 63% to 35% favored Congress setting a 
timetable for withdrawal.29 Therefore, despite public opposition to a 
troop surge, President Bush went ahead, and Congress didn’t try to 
stop him because they were free to do as they please due to the 
public’s unawareness.  
IV. The Public Wants Congress to Approve 
“Do you think the president should or should not be required to 
get the approval of Congress before sending United States armed 
forces into action outside the United States?”30 In November 1973 the 
response favoring congressional approval was 80% and in May 2008 it 
was an equally stark 79%.31 In fact, for the past thirty-five years there 
has been little change in this basic sentiment as an overwhelming 
majority of Americans believe that the president needs congressional 
approval before committing troops overseas. The American people 
want Congress to execute its constitutional duties, or in other words, 
do its job. 
In February 1999, for example, 54% approved of a peacekeeping 
mission in Kosovo (40% disapproved), whereas 43% Americans 
26. See id. at 515.  
27. Frank Newport, Majority Wants Congress to Set Limits on U.S. Troop 
Presence in Iraq, in ALEC M. GALLUP & FRANK NEWPORT, THE GALLUP 
POLL: PUBLIC OPINION 2007, at 63–64 (2007).  
28. Id.  
29. Id.  
30. Frank Newport, Public Wants Congress to Approve Military Action, 
Bombings, GALLUP (July 7, 2008), http://www.gallup.com/poll/10865 
8/public-wants-congress-approve-military-action-bombings.aspx. 
31. Id.  
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supported airstrikes and 45% opposed.32 However, 78% of Americans 
wanted President Clinton to seek approval from Congress.33 In 
September 2002, 69% said congressional approval was necessary for an 
invasion of Iraq and 51% said Congress should not give unlimited 
authority to use military action against Iraq.34 A CBS poll from that 
same month found 44% believed Congress was not asking enough 
questions, yet 22% believed Congress was asking too many questions, 
16% about right, and 18% don’t know.35 
Beyond the basic question of obtaining congressional approval, 
other specific scenarios polled in May 2008 indicate the desire for 
congressional approval remains strong with few exceptions. 
 
Poll Question Yes—the 
president 
needs 
congressional 
approval 
No—the 
president 
shouldn’t need 
congressional 
approval 
No opinion 
Do you think 
the president 
should or 
should not be 
required to get 
the approval of 
Congress before 
sending U.S. 
armed forces 
into action 
outside the 
United 
States?36 
 
 
 
Nov. 1973: 79% 
May 2008: 70% 
 
Nov. 1973: 18% 
May 2008: 28% 
 
Nov. 1973: 3% 
May 2008: 2% 
32. Mark Gillespie, New Poll Shows Support for Peacekeeping Role in 
Kosovo, GALLUP (Feb. 22, 1999), http://www.gallup.com/poll/4060/ne 
w-poll-shows-support-peacekeeping-role-kosovo.aspx. 
33. Id.  
34. Frank Newport & Lydia Saad, Americans’ View: U.S. Should Not Go It 
Alone in Iraq, GALLUP (Sept. 24, 2002), http://www.gallup.com/poll/68 
74/americans-view-us-should-alone-iraq.aspx. 
35. Jaime Holguin, War with Iraq: Americans in No Hurry, CBS (Feb. 11, 
2009, 8:59 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/10/06/opinion 
/polls/main524496.shtml.  
36. FRANK NEWPORT ET AL., WINNING THE WHITE HOUSE 2008, at 429 
(2009). 
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Do you think the president should or should not be required to get the 
approval of Congress before sending U.S. armed forces into action under 
each of the following circumstances?37 
If U.S. were 
attacked:  
46% 53% 1% 
If American 
citizens were in 
danger or in 
need of rescue 
abroad:  
40% 58% 2% 
To conduct a 
humanitarian 
mission in 
response to a 
natural 
disaster:  
49% 50% 1% 
If president did 
not expect a 
long combat 
operation:  
76% 22% 2% 
If president 
wanted to use 
Air Force or 
Navy planes to 
bomb suspected 
terrorists: 
70% 28% 2% 
 
V. The Practical Effect of the WPR 
There has not been a president since the WPR’s passage that has 
accepted the constitutionality of the WPR. Although, President 
Obama has not stated that the WPR is unconstitutional as his 
predecessors have, he maintains that his administration’s actions have 
been “consistent with” the WPR. When confronted with the situation 
in Libya and the use of U.S. military force, the Obama 
Administration instead took the position that WPR does not apply to 
Libya for a host of reasons.38  
37. Id. at 430.  
38. Charlie Savage & Mark Landler, White House Defends Continuing U.S. 
Role in Libya Operation, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2011, at A16 (“We are 
not saying the War Powers Resolution is unconstitutional or should be 
scrapped or that we can refuse to consult Congress. We are saying the 
limited nature of this particular mission is not the kind of ‘hostilities’ 
envisioned by the War Powers Resolution.”).  
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However, research indicates that the WPR appears to have 
impacted the behavior of presidents because presidents have rarely 
used force for more than sixty days without congressional 
authorization. David Auerswald and Peter Cowhey examined conflicts 
with greater than 500 troops during “three periods of similar 
duration.”39 During 1900–1925, the United States undertook five 
major conflicts without prior congressional approval whereby “fighting 
and subsequent occupation lasted from two years to nineteen years.”40 
During 1947–1972, there were eight major conflicts without prior 
congressional approval whereby fighting and subsequent occupation 
lasted from two and a half months to seven years. During both time 
periods the presidents’ use of force was not challenged. 
After the passage of the WPR, as well as the American experience 
in Vietnam, there were fourteen conflicts without prior congressional 
authorization from 1973–1995. Ten were less than sixty days in 
duration and the remaining four resulted in congressional action. 
They were: 1983 Lebanon, 1992 Somalia, 1987 Persian Gulf reflagging, 
and 1990 Desert Shield. Auerswald and Cowhey state, “Our findings 
demonstrate that presidents respond to the War Powers Resolution 
by limiting the duration of international conflicts to avoid 
domestically costly battles with Congress as well as the international 
ramifications of domestic debate.”41 
VI. Conclusion 
Presidents rarely consult Congress before using force. However, it 
appears that presidents have adhered to the WPR timelines. If a 
president’s use of force is “swift or small scale” Congress acquiesces.42 
Brief, focused military operations involving few casualties will result 
in favorable support for presidents. Longer conflicts are met with 
“either congressional threats or legislative action,” but only if the 
polling changes and it becomes an unpopular use of force.43 It is 
unlikely that any calls for repealing the WPR will be answered. 
Simply put, the WPR allows the U.S. Congress political cover and the 
option to abdicate their role in making any decisions that might 
ultimately prove unpopular with voters during their next election.  
 
39. Auerswald & Cowhey, supra note 23, at 518–19. 
40. Id. at 518 
41. Id. at 507. 
42. Id. at 523. 
43. Id.  
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